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Economic Values and Dynamism 
in the EU Economy 
Stefano Micossi* 
 
This paper addresses economic values and dynamism in the context of general European values. More precisely, it 
discusses how the lack of dynamism in parts of the European economy is not explained, in the main, by a lack of 
technology or capital or natural endowment; it is not even explained by big government, high taxation and strong 
social protection per se. Rather, the main explanation is to be found in the way certain economic institutions 
influence or reflect our culture and our attitudes vis-à-vis change and risk-taking. 
 
This paper essentially follows the ideas of a prominent American economist, Edmund Phelps of Columbia 
University, who has provided new perspectives for understanding low growth in the European economy. 
 
The notion of prosperity 
A prosperous economy is more than simply 
high income per capita – it is an economy with 
high wages in a wide range of jobs that are also 
engaging and challenging. 
Job satisfaction in turn has positive effects 
such as promoting high participation rates in 
the labour force, feeding morale, loyalty and 
commitment to one’s employer or activity, as 
well as to society as a whole. 
The key condition for prosperity thus defined is 
dynamism, not high productivity. Dynamism 
depends on an environment that generates 
strong stimulus to change and is open to new 
players and new experiments in production, 
distribution and financing. Dynamic economies, 
of course, will tend to display high productivity 
– but high productivity economies can show low 
dynamisms, the obvious examples being 
Germany and Italy. 
A high productivity economy can display low 
dynamism when the technology is not generated 
from within, but comes from outside, as was the 
case in much of Western Europe in the second 
half of the last century; when company control 
cannot be challenged in open capital markets; 
when foreign investment is discouraged and 
domestic producers and banks are protected. 
 
 
 
Dynamism is the ability to generate a lot of innovation 
plus an effective selection mechanism to drive and select 
them. Dynamism is supported by strong competition and 
free entry, financial institutions that encourage risk- 
taking, and entrepreneurs willing to risk their capital in 
the hope of large rewards. These entrepreneurs need a 
supportive cultural and social environment, notably 
including widespread social acceptance and indeed 
approval of risk-taking and the fact that winners will 
make large profits. Making money must be accepted as a 
good thing, and not appear as some kind of sin requiring 
penitence and engendering social resentment. 
Corporatism 
Corporatism, as pioneered in Continental Europe in the 
1920s, basically was a system for mediating conflicts 
between labour and capital in the large corporations 
produced by the second industrial revolution. It soon 
evolved into a tripartite system of big corporations, big 
unions and big banks, whose leaders negotiate and decide 
– under strong government oversight – the ‘strategic’ 
economic choices, and control economic change through 
barriers to entry, licensing systems, standards, labour 
unions and the like. 
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The core of the system is that the elites who run the 
corporations, the unions and the banks block change unless 
there is consensus, and they work together to keep the 
system closed and impede entry by new firms and new 
financial intermediaries. Wage systems are also coordinated 
centrally, and entry into the labour market is regulated by 
union agreements that effectively protect incumbents 
against competition from newcomers. 
The state intervenes in the economy to support corporatist 
strategic choices and to provide subsidies and privileged 
access to credit for favoured investment projects. With 
corporatism, there is also a lot of rent-seeking behaviour, 
cronyism and corruption, because contracts and markets 
may be won on the basis of connections and bribes. Merit 
and performance are only one among many factors that 
determine the choice of managers, partners in business or 
financial arrangements. 
Corporatism is rigid in that outsiders are kept from entering 
and insiders are protected, exit is retarded, failure is slowly 
recognised and change requires a high degree of consensus. 
But corporatism has also shown a lot of flexibility in 
adapting to changing circumstances and helping solve 
coordination problems in modern societies. This was the 
case with Italian concertazione helping the reduction of 
inflation in the 1980s, German co-determination (mit 
Spreche) supporting long-term investment strategies, and 
workers councils fostering the reduction of industrial 
conflict. In the Netherlands in the 1980s, the governments 
and social partners were able to agree on a dramatic 
reduction of real wages and public spending (the Wasenaar 
Pact), thus revamping growth without renouncing 
corporatist practices. 
There is even a decentralised version of corporatism, which 
views the corporation as surrounded by a set of 
stakeholders for which it has to care. According to this 
view, the corporation must deal effectively not only with 
customers, competitors and suppliers, but also worry about 
the well-being of other ‘stakeholders’. It cannot simply try 
to make as much money as it can, but must also take care of 
other goals such as a clean environment, ethical investment 
or maintaining employment in disadvantaged regions even 
at a loss. It must do so, however, by spontaneously going 
beyond what is required by the existing laws, regulations 
and common social practices; because of course there can 
be no special merit, or social appreciation, in respecting the 
law and established practices. 
It should not escape our attention that the company will be 
able to meet these complex demands from society only to 
the extent that it enjoys some kind of rent, either because its 
customers are willing to pay a premium price for its 
products, in view of its nice attitude with respect to societal 
goals, or because it enjoys market power, and therefore is 
able to extract a rent from its customers. Either way, the 
company will in fact be giving back to society a part, 
typically a small part, of what it receives in the form of 
protection from competition. 
The basic problem with corporatism is that it tries to retain 
the private income and private ownership of wealth, which 
is central to capitalism, but in a way to ‘remove the brains’ 
of capitalism; to curtail the inner motor of experimentation 
and discovery undertaken by decentralised and 
uncoordinated entrepreneurs and financiers, on which 
capitalism relies to select opportunities and innovate, and 
replace it with decisions on investment and innovation 
based on social consensus. 
This explains why corporatism is good at managing 
imitation and incremental improvement, but not invention 
and endogenous, radical innovation. And this is why it 
could not cope well with the IT revolution, since this 
technology is in many ways inconsistent with, and very 
upsetting for, established economic and social equilibrium. 
It is interesting to recall, in this connection, that when the 
ICT revolution was taking off around the mid-1970s, there 
was a government programme in the US to accelerate the 
creation of information highways, i.e. the infrastructure 
necessary for the exploitation of ICT. In Europe, we 
launched a programme for the information society, 
basically aiming at reducing social resistance to ICT by 
showing with restricted experiments that no one was 
threatened. 
The set of values associated with corporatism 
Cultural values and attitudes, as may be expected, tend to 
be consistent with the economic environment. I will not try 
to decide whether it is culture supporting economic 
institutions or vice versa. Open and dynamic economic 
environments tend to be associated with an ethos of 
ambition, competition, self-help and initiative. People take 
risks because they have confidence, and they have 
confidence because they are supported in their risk-taking 
by the social environment, financiers and even the legal and 
judicial system. Failure in business does not lead to any 
economic, social or legal stigma for the failed entrepreneur. 
On the other hand, you have high-productivity economies, 
such as Italy and Germany, where innovation is not 
encouraged, and often is actively discouraged by entry 
barriers, conservative bankers who only give money to 
those who have money, aggressive unions who fear that 
innovation will weaken their grip over the workforce. 
The prevailing attitude is that one’s economic position in 
life is determined by luck, connections, or inheritance, and 
certainly not by capacity and initiative. For this very 
reason, there is a lack of confidence and ubiquitously low 
morale. There is also the widespread belief that if 
somebody makes a lot of money, he probably did so 
because he managed to get special protection from the law 
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As a result, big profits became the target of invidious 
resentment, which on occasion may lead to confiscation or 
sharp restrictions on the business, notably when the 
business is in a heavily regulated sector and there is a 
change in the governing majority. 
These attitudes have deep roots. Compare the role of family 
values and education in promoting a culture of self-reliance 
in the US and one of dependence and status-consciousness 
in much of the EU. 
Some tentative conclusions 
From Adam Smith onwards, economists always knew that 
legal and social institutions determine economic 
performance. They are not sure on the directions of 
causation: whether institutions are the endogenous product 
of culture and values, or whether on the contrary the right 
institutions will generate the right set of values. 
Be that as it may, in practice there is little choice but to try 
and improve institutions, and hope that attitudes and culture 
will also evolve in the process. 
The analysis above calls attention to the fact that 
institutions are not all alike in promoting a high-
performance and dynamic economy. High taxation may not 
be so good for business, but will do less damage if 
resources are well used and there is a clear benefit for the 
economy and society of public spending. Strong welfare is 
expensive and may hamper incentives to work, but also has 
positive effects of societal cohesion and acceptance of the 
market economy. 
The fact is that some high-taxation, high-welfare 
economies seem to prosper while others languish. What 
makes the difference is the way public money is spent and 
social assistance is provided. 
For instance, protecting the employed from the risk of 
becoming unemployed is useful to the extent that it 
facilitates labour mobility; it may become an unbearable 
burden if it makes it impossible to move resources away 
from unprofitable businesses. Thus, the consequences are 
very different depending on whether protection takes the 
form of a restriction on the possibility to fire workers who 
are no longer productive in a particular occupation; or 
whether instead it takes the form of social insurance 
providing income, training and assistance in finding a new 
job for those displaced by technological change and 
globalisation. 
Similarly, institutions that favour capital mobility, 
including well-functioning markets for corporate control, 
are good for economic dynamisms; systems of entrenched 
control where managers and owners are shielded from 
market discipline are bad. 
In general, institutions that foster competition and merit are 
good; those that protect incumbents are bad, in the 
production of goods and services as much as in the 
production of education, research or culture. Retarding 
adjustment, impeding entry, resisting change is not the right 
way to promote dynamism, together with its benefits of 
high-quality and high-reward jobs. 
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About CEPS 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research 
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from 
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and 
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public 
events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to 
climate change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
       Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 